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ABSTRACT 
 
The present article considers, and rejects, four arguments against the privatization of roads, and in 
favor of our present system of road socialism. They are 1. Eminent domain is cheap, efficient, and 
necessary, but only government can avail itself of their “benefits.” 2. Roads are not perfectly 
competitive, but rather, necessarily, are characterized by monopolistic elements, which only the state 
can address. 3. Roads are different then everything else; people impose waiting costs on others 
without taking them into account; this externalities problem is a market failure that, again, only 
government can solve. 4. Road privatization is unfair to abutting property owners. In section 3, the 
paper deals with five objections to, or difficulties with, street and highway privatization: 1. The 
government has violated “Non-Compete” clauses to protect private investors in roadways. 2. Private 
industry would find it impossible to discern rational prices for its services. 3. Should public roads be 
commercialized before being privatized? That is, should the state first charge a price for these 
services and then privatize, or do the opposite? 4. Road privatization would be a public relations 
nightmare. How should this be dealt with? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
For the purposes of this article, we will take it as a matter of stipulation that it is 
desirable to privatize all traffic arteries. That is, all extant streets, roads, avenues, 
highways, etc., should forthwith be taken out of the control of governments, whether 
federal, state or local, and placed into private hands. There is a wealth of literature 
attesting to the benefits of market provision of goods and services vis-à-vis 
governmental, in general, which is well known especially since the demise of the 
Soviet economy, and also with specific reference to roadways, (1) which is far less well 
known. 
Rather than reiterating the case for free enterprise in this domain vis-à-vis socialism, 
(2) we will instead focus in section 2 on several objections to implementation, in 
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section 3 consider some difficulties with the transition period. We conclude in section 
4. 
 
 
2. Objections 
 
 
2.1 Eminent domain is cheap, efficient, and necessary 
 
One argument against private roads is that the costs of amassing rights of way on 
which to build them would be enormous. Suppose a private highway company is 
trying to build a facility stretching from Boston to Los Angeles, or even from New 
Orleans to St. Louis. They have purchased sufficient acreage in order to do so, when 
they approach Mr. Harry Holdout, who refuses to sell at any but an astronomical 
price. This, alone, would put paid to the entire enterprise. Not only would not coast-
to-coast highways be impossible under private enterprise, but this applies to intra state 
roads as well. Nor would, even, city streets be free of such impediments; after all, 
Harry Holdouts can be found anywhere there is money to be made by obstructing 
progress. 
No. What is needed if roads are to be built in the first place is the government, for 
this is the only institution in society that can rely upon powers of eminent domain. (3) 
Here, the state simply commandeers the property in question, paying what it 
determines is a fair market price. This can save millions of dollars, rendering public 
provision of highway building far more efficient than private. 
There are difficulties with this objection. For one thing, it commits a very basic 
economic fallacy, a confusion of real costs with out of pocket expenses. Of course, it 
government sets its own price, based upon what it feels is “fair market value” this is 
likely to be far below the level the property owner might insist upon. But the true costs 
are the alternatives foregone, and no one can know them apart from the owner in 
question. 
Even to characterize him as “Harry Holdout” is to do violence to economic reality. 
For anyone, in any transaction, can use such a derogation against anyone who will not 
sell his wares for what the buyer deems an appropriate price. The point is, there is 
simply no objective way to distinguish the so called holdout from any other property 
owner who will not sell at a price favored by the would be purchaser.  
Then there is the fact that there are often several if not numerous routes that a road 
from one city to another could take. All one need do is purchase options to buy 
contiguous land, at previously agreed upon prices, and if there is any supposed 
“holdout” activity, e.g., high prices on the part of one or a few sellers on any of them, 
merely utilize another. In this way, the property owners along each of these routes are 
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made in effect to compete with each other. And this is to say nothing of the possibility 
of bridging over, or tunneling under, the holdings of a recalcitrant seller. It will of 
course be more expensive to do so, but this expense places an upper bound upon 
what the road assembler need pay to any one property owner along his selected route. 
This analysis can also be used to refute the claim that free market operation of roads 
will be paralyzed, given that one road owner can always refuse to allow another to 
cross his own property with another such facility. Suppose that there is a road running 
from east to west; it does not matter whether this is a highway between two cities, or a 
street within any one city. Another entrepreneur wishes to install a north south road, 
which would have to cross the first one. He has assembled all the land he needs for 
this purpose, except for one parcel: the land now occupied by the east west 
thoroughfare. When he approaches the owner of the extant road, he is met with a 
stony rebuff; he refuses to sell at any price! 
It is clear that without north south roads, our transportation system will collapse, 
perhaps before it even gets started. However, there are several difficulties with this 
scenario. First of all, it is exceedingly unlikely that the would be builder of the north 
south artery would have invested any money in his enterprise without first ensuring 
that he had complete right of way. Perhaps this “up and down” route could avoid the 
“sideways” one entirely, if the owner of the latter were adamant. Secondly, it is 
unlikely in the extreme that the east west corridor owner would take any such stand. 
After all, if no roads cross his own, then the capital value of his own possessions will 
be greatly attenuated. Motorists will be able to use it, only, to traverse in and east or 
west direction, as opposed to using virtually all 360 degrees. If he did, it is 
exceedingly probable that his board of directors would toss him out on his ear. Third, 
if all else, somehow, fails, the north south would be builder still has the same option 
available to him as did the land assembler we were considering above who was faced 
with Harry Holdout (which is precisely the role now played by the east west owner): 
he can build a bridge over the latter’s land, or tunnel under it. (4)  
 
 
  
2.2 Roads are not perfectly competitive 
 
A private roadway industry would not be perfectly competitive. Therefore, there would 
be dead weight inefficiency losses in its operation. Thus, it should not be privatized. 
  
There are several flaws in this objection and they are serious ones. First, a perfectly 
competitive industry is an utter impossibility in the real world. The requirements for 
this status are numerous and ridiculously otherworldly: completely homogeneous 
products; an indefinitely large, not to say infinite, number of both buyers (to stave off 
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monopsony) (5) and sellers (to preclude monopoly); full and complete information 
about everything relevant on the part of all market participants; zero profits and 
equilibrium. The reductio ad absurdum of this objection is that not only could roads 
not be privatized under such impossible criteria, but neither could anything else be, 
either. That is, this is a recipe for a complete takeover by the government of the entire 
economy, whether by nationalization (communism) or regulation (fascism) it matters 
little.  
Second, even if, arguendo, it were somehow possible for such a state of affairs to 
come into being, it would not be advantageous to mankind for it to do so. This is 
because perfect competition speaks only in terms of structure of industry; it is totally 
silent on the issue of behavior. Specifically, there is simply no room in this concept for 
rivalrous action, the fountainhead of true competition and progress. 
 
 
2.3. Roads are different then everything else; people impose waiting costs on others 
without taking them into account 
 
Consider the thinking processes of the man ready to commute to his downtown job, 
during the morning rush hour. He can be counted upon to take into account the 
degree to which the congestion he expects to find will slow him down. He would not 
embark upon this trip did he not regard its benefits greater than its costs, and the 
slowness of traffic is one of the costs he will most certainly incorporate into his 
decision making process. 
However, in traveling on the highway at this time, he also, albeit to a very small 
degree, adds to the traffic congestion that would exist without his participation in it. To 
wit, by making this decision, he imposes waiting costs on other drivers. Does he take 
this second, very different cost into account? He does not! But in refraining from 
doing so, he acts as an external diseconomy on every other driver. Of course, he is not 
the only motorist to be guilty of this oversight. Our analysis is perfectly general at this 
point: what we have said about this one road user is true of every other one as well. 
Thus, all drivers in this situation impose such waiting costs on every other one of 
them, with not a one of them taking them into account. 
Such is the objection we are now considering to road privatization. 
It is a very poor one, insofar as it operates, if it does so at all, no only with regard to 
roads, but far more widely. This objection applies, at least in principle, to every good 
or service for which there are queues, or waiting lists, or uneven demand. For 
example, seats at popular movies or plays, demand for pretty much most goods right 
before Christmas, Super Bowl or World Series tickets, etc. In each of these cases, the 
same could be said of people on the demand side as of motorists during rush hour: 
they take into account their own waiting time, but not that they impose on others by 
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their own participation in the queue. If this objection were with merit, therefore, and it 
barred road privatization, then all of these other goods and services would have to fall 
to government provision as well. But in this direction lies communism 
 However, while it is indubitably true that this is indeed a problem of epic proportions 
on our nation’s roadways, it is far less so in any of these other situations. Why? 
Because in the market place, when there is a peak load demand, prices tend to rise. 
And when they do, this tends to mitigate the original problem. For example, tickets for 
the NBA or NHL playoffs are far higher than for ordinary games; prices are greater 
right before Christmas than right after, during January and Boxing Day sales. Movies 
and plays typically charge more for weekend evening shows than for matinees, or 
Tuesday nights. Thus, the uneven or peak load demand gets flattened out. In other 
words, deep within the bowels of the free enterprise system is the cure for this so 
called “market failure.” In other words, it is not a “market failure” at all, but one of 
government mismanagement. 
The contrast with the public sector is a stark one indeed. Compare and contrast the 
reactions of public and private sellers during the Christmas rush. For-profit firms roll 
up their sleeves, hire extra workers, stock their shelves almost to the bursting point, 
and proudly announce they are open for business, ready and willing to help the 
consumers satisfy their demands. And what of statist counterparts? Take the post 
office as an example. They urge that people mail early, to avoid the Christmas rush! 
The customer is not “always right,” it would appear, in government “service.” 
It is the same with roadway use. Do the street and highway managers charge more for 
use of these facilities during peak load times, which would have the result of ironing 
out the peaks and reducing congestion? To ask this question is to answer it: they do 
not. Rather, the same prices exist all throughout the week, namely, zero. Things are 
worse, far worse, with regard to bridges and tunnels also under the control of our road 
socialists. (6) Here, anti peak load pricing is engaged in? In other words, lower prices 
are charged during the hours of heaviest demand, thus exacerbating the problem. 
How does this come about? 
Bridge and tunnel authorities commonly sell monthly passes at lower prices per trip 
than otherwise obtain. But precisely what kind of driver is likely to travel to the central 
business district 20-24 times per month? A suburban shopper? An out of towner? A 
rare visitor to the city? None of the above. Rather, obviously, the lion’s share of these 
tickets will be taken up by regular commuters, precisely the ones most likely to use 
them during morning rush hours into the city and afternoon ones out of it. 
 
 
2.4. Road privatization is unfair to abutting property owners 
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It is impossible to predict precisely how a competitive market would function with 
regard to roads. If shoes were always and everywhere the province of government, 
and some rash individual were to advocate the end of footwear socialism and the 
implementation of private profit making firms in this industry, it might strain credulity. 
The objections would come thick and fast: how many shoe stores would be located on 
each block? Who would determine the color of the shoes? How would resources be 
allocated between boots, sneakers, runners, bedroom slippers, shower-thongs? What 
would be done to ensure a sufficient supply of shoelaces? Or, would there be loafers? 
Or would they be fastened with Velcro? Would the market provide high-heeled shoes 
for women? What about changing styles? Without government control, would profit 
seekers be able to accommodate alterations in taste, or, more ominously, would they 
impose their own aesthetic sensibilities on consumers? How, oh how, would the poor 
get shoes?  
These difficulties present no particular problem. There is no movement afoot to 
nationalize the shoe industry. Were we to find ourselves in any such predicament, we 
would readily de nationalize, secure in the knowledge brought to us by years of 
reasonably satisfactory service from this quarter. 
Roads are different. Although at one time in our history turnpike companies provided 
these services to travelers, no one now alive has had any experience with them. (7) 
That alone goes some way toward explaining why, despite a large literature supporting 
roads (see footnote 2), regardless of the failure of the Soviet system that should 
awaken society to the benefits of privatization, we still suffer under government control 
of streets and highways. Moreover, difficult as are the problems of envisioning a fully 
free enterprise road system in operation, even more challenging are those of the 
transition period. 
Take the problem of access as an example. One of the criticisms of free market 
roadways is that the homeowner or business firm will be “trapped” on its premises, if 
it is completely surrounded by four privately owned roads, as in the nature of things, 
it inevitably would be. In making the case for markets in this industry, it is easy to 
show that this “problem” is a straw man. For one thing, just as we now have title 
search when property changes hands, so under a system of free enterprise for streets, 
there would be “access search,” to ensure access and egress. For another, it would be 
in the financial interest of the road owner building a new facility to attract customers. 
Surely, he would fail dismally in this regard did he not ensure them of such basic 
amenities. (8) 
But matters are far different when we contemplate not a private enterprise street and 
highway system de novo, but rather the transition period from our present road 
socialist institutions to one of pure laissez faire capitalism. For in this process, those in 
charge of the conversion will have to attempt to mimic the market, and, as we have 
established above with the shoe example, this cannot be done on the basis of 
7 
economic theory alone. Rather, it is essentially an entrepreneurial task to establish how 
the shoe, the road, or, indeed, any other industry would function under a regime of 
economic freedom. But mimic the market they must, otherwise how else can the 
access and egress problem be addressed? If the roads are given to private firms, and 
no provision whatsoever is made for this phenomenon, this would be equivalent to 
giving these companies not only the streets themselves, but also everything abutting 
them. For, if they were given the roads with no strings attached, and could charge 
whatever they wished, they might set the tolls at a rate that the internal home and 
factory owners would be indifferent between keeping their property and relinquishing 
it. That is, the road owners, with the means at their disposal of blocking the internal 
property holders from access and egress, (9) would be able to capture, at least 
theoretically, the entire capital value of all these holdings. In order to obviate this 
possibility, those responsible for privatizing roads will have to mimic the street use 
charges that would have been imposed by a non existent private industry, in this 
contrary to fact conditional scenario. 
Suppose, now, that somehow, this was accomplished. Still, our difficulties are not 
over. For a property owner abutting one of these avenues might say something along 
the following lines: “I don’t care a fig for the price you are allowing the road owner to 
charge me. I reject it, utterly. These tolls might seem fair to you, but not to me. Had I 
been confronted with them when I purchased my land, I never would have bought it.” 
(10)  
It cannot be denied that this is a powerful objection to the process of road 
privatization. We have not, after all, been able to offer a purely market process of 
transfer from the public to the private realm. Rather, we have been forced to use a 
bureaucratic process, wherein we non entrepreneurs have  attempted to mimic the 
(non existent) market. And yet, and yet…. This objection seems too harsh by half. 
After all, it is not our fault that we cannot fully anticipate the market prices that would 
have eventuated, had the state never entered into this realm with its cloven feet. And 
even if we could, arguendo, any particular economic actor, such as the objector, could 
have legitimately rejected it. From one perspective, what we are trying to do is to 
unscramble the egg, and it cannot be done. 
Rather than answering this particular objection, we will take refuge in the claim that 
all or at least virtually all privatization efforts are subject to it. Thus, there is nothing 
here in particular aimed at road privatization; it rather constitutes an objection to all 
such efforts. 
In order to see this point, consider the privatization of a Russian nobleman’s castle. It 
might have been nationalized in 1917, and is given back sometime during the period 
1989-2003. Is it the identical castle as existed in 1917? Of course, it is not. Is it 
even, to continue our analogy, the same castle as an imaginary one that would have 
existed, on the assumption that it was never nationalized in the first place? (11) It is 
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difficult to answer this, to say the least. And, any answer we could give to the Russian 
nobleman (or his heirs) could be rejected by him (them) on similar grounds as those 
offered by our objector to road privatization. Namely, “well, this is the way you might 
have treated this castle in the intervening years, but it certainly isn’t the way I (we) 
would have managed it.” 
But we need not resort to an example as esoteric as a castle. Any bit of farmland (or 
indeed, any other kind of land) will do. For it, too, will have or might have been 
treated differently than the manner that might have ensued had there been no initial 
land seizure. The person to whom we are now returning it will always be in a position 
to quibble with us; to assert that what he is being given back is not precisely what was 
taken away from him. He can say, no matter what additional amount is given him to 
compensate for this phenomenon, that it is unfair, that he would never have agreed to 
it. Merely the passage of time will always render this true. Therefore, we road 
privatizers need not worry about this objection any more than any other privatizer, of 
anything else other than roads. 
Here is a second reply to the objection: (virtually) (12) any conversion to the market is 
better than allowing the status quo of road socialism. If we were to accept this 
objection as definitive, not only would there not be any road privatization, there would 
not be a return of any property from the public to the private sector. Ostensibly, the 
person making the objection is on the side of the angels. He can be, and we have so 
far, interpreted him as making this objection in behalf of the property owner abutting 
the road. However, this is also a more ominous interpretation that can be placed upon 
this objection. Objectively, at least, if it is taken seriously, it will spell the death knell 
of privatization efforts. Quo bono, from such an objection? Obviously, socialists. (13) 
A third rejoinder is as follows. Privatization, at least for our present purposes, may be 
likened to the just response to a crime. Someone (the government in our case) in effect 
stole something from the rightful owners (private roads, here, by either nationalizing 
private property and/or refusing to allow this industry to come into being in the first 
place). Naturally, in the case of crime, the emphasis should be on compensating the 
victim. (14) However, it is impossible to peer into the victim’s mind, to discern the 
contrary to fact conditional regarding how much he would have voluntarily accepted 
for what was in reality stolen from him had this nefarious deed not taken place. Given 
no interpersonal comparisons of utility, stipulate that there are no objective criteria for 
such losses, it is necessarily impossible that this problem be solved to the extent that 
the victim can never complain about the level of compensation given him. 
 
 
3. Transitional problems 
 
3.1. “Non-Compete” clauses to protect private investors 
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Under contract with the government, private express toll lanes were built in the 
median of California's State Route 91. The firm in question was guaranteed that this 
State would not later add to its capacity in competition with its own new facility. In 
other words, there was a “non compete” clause in the agreement, similar to that which 
exists in many private labor contracts.  
However, traffic increased in this area. As a result, Orange County exercised an 
option in this contract and bought out the SR-91 investors. This, in effect, 
renationalized the initially private Express Lanes, and allowed the State to build as 
more road capacity as it wished. 
At the other end of the country, a similar initiative was dealt with in a very different 
way. Consider the private firm that built the “Dulles Greenway” toll road near 
Washington D.C. With no such stipulation in their contract the State of Virginia was 
not estopped (15) from building as much new capacity, in competition with this 
private roadway, as it wished. As a result, they added to their parallel Route 7, and 
economically undermined the private builder.  
One obvious comment is that private and public road capacity, serving side by side, is 
like trying to mix oil and water; it is unstable at best. It is rather difficult for an 
entrepreneur to continue to exist, let alone to prosper, when the government is giving 
away a very similar service for free. (16)  
So, should the government sign contracts with private builders, offering “non-
compete” clauses? To ask this is to answer it, at least from a libertarian (17) 
perspective. The government should absent itself from this industry, root and branch, 
immediately if not sooner. All roads should be commercialized at once; then, this 
problem would cease to exist. 
Nor is this problem by any means confined to roads and streets. It exists, too, with 
regard to private bookstores being forced to compete against public libraries; for 
private gymnasiums faced with the competition from governmental playgrounds, 
parks, municipal swimming pools, etc. The state, here, plays the role of the ghoul, or 
the “undead,” in horror movies; short of killing it with a silver bullet, or with garlic, or 
whatever, the latter pair have an unfair advantage over humans, or entrepreneurs. 
They can be bankrupted, but their governmental sector counterparts cannot be. (18) 
Suppose, now, that this happy scenario is not in the cards. That is, like it or not, 
governmental road systems will not disappear, at least not right away. Suppose we are 
confronted not with the question of whether the state should play any role whatsoever 
in highway management, with rather with the issue of given that it will for the 
foreseeable future continue to play a gigantic role in this regard, should it or should it 
not offer non compete clauses to the private establishments who add to roadway 
capacity? 
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This is by far a more difficult question to answer. We propose to do so under two very 
different headings: utilitarian and deontological.  
The latter is easy. As a pure matter of justice, anything that supports private initiatives 
in this field is good. Non-compete clauses do so. QED. 
The former is far more difficult. On the one hand, the worse shape statist roads are in, 
the higher the probability there is that they will be replaced by capitalist institutions. If 
so, then the last thing we want are non compete clauses, because this will strengthen 
the very few private road companies now allowed by the powers that be; this, in turn, 
will render the present situation more stable. Thus, paradoxically, supporting limited 
private enterprise in this manner will undermine placing roads totally under capitalism 
in the future. Worse is better, in this view of the world. 
On the other hand, people now living need every bit of help they can get to rescue 
them from public road management. Non compete clauses will encourage private 
companies to take on some small percentage of the nation’s roadways, and this, at 
least, will help some few people who patronize them. 
The difficulty is that we literally have no way of weighting these two considerations, so 
that an overall determination can be made. Suppose, for example, that non-compete 
clauses increased private road management so that it now made up 1% of the total 
(this is a vast overestimate, in terms of present mileage totals). Posit, further, that this 
would save x number of lives per year, and y amount of motorist’s time, but that it 
would put off, from 100 to 101 years, the date on which all roads would be 
privatized. Where is the interest rate, on the basis of which we could discount future 
time and lives saved, compared to present ones in this regard? There simply is no 
such thing. Therefore, it is impossible to definitively answer this question in any 
rational or objective manner. 
 
 
3.2. Pricing 
 
How much should road users pay for roads, and how should they be charged? As we 
have seen with our shoe example, it is difficult to anticipate the market. Nevertheless, 
it is possible to discern some patterns in the midst of the fog, and to make predictions 
on the basis of them. 
There is little doubt that at least in the long run a private highway and street industry 
would utilize electronic road pricing (ERP). After all, universal product codes are now 
relied upon for a myriad of private goods; there is no reason to think that automobiles 
and trucks could not be similarly outfitted as is now done for bread and cough drops. 
However, the free enterprise philosophy would maintain that roadways should be 
privatized at whatever level of technology is presently available to a society; certainly, 
this quest should not have to wait until the development of ERP.  
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Nor did it, historically. The earliest roads, we must never forget, were private 
turnpikes. Tollgates collected on the basis of the weight of the wagon, the number of 
axels, the number of horses and the width of the wheels. Thin-wheeled vehicles could 
go faster, but would create ruts in the road, and were therefore charged more. Thick-
wheeled ones would serve something of the function of a steam-roller, flattening out 
the road and making it more passable for others, and were thus charged less. In more 
recent history, places like Singapore used another low technology collection method. 
A bull’s eye would be superimposed on the city map, and a different color assigned to 
each of the areas thus created. The highest fees would be charged for use of those 
areas of the city in the center of the bull’s eye, with lower prices as the motorist was 
restricted, successively, to the more outlying areas. Strict penalties, needless to say, 
would be imposed on travelers found in areas not permitted by their color-coded 
permits. (19) 
 
 
3.3. Should public roads be commercialized before being privatized? 
 
That is, should the government be encouraged to institute electronic road pricing 
before the privatization process, or should we merely sit back and wait for private 
firms to do so once these facilities are under their control? 
One argument for immediate ERP is that the sooner it is done, the sooner we shall 
have economic rationality on the nation’s highways, and an end (or at least a vast 
diminution) of traffic congestion. Another is offered by Gabriel Roth: “One could keep 
the system of dedicated road funds and pay private owners out of such funds, in the 
same way that state roads are now financed. But there would have to be a mechanism 
for adjusting the road-use charges in accordance with the wishes of road users. All this 
would be easier if roads were commercialized before being privatized.” (20)  
But the arguments on the other side seem more powerful. For one thing, government 
roadway pricing (on bridges and tunnels) has already been tried, and it has been a 
dismal failure. Instead of engaging in peak load pricing, they have used anti peak load 
pricing, and have actually worsened the situation that would have otherwise obtained, 
not improved it. True, only some of this pricing has been electronic, more and more 
as the years go on, but this does not seem to be definitive. An institution that would 
misprice before the advent of ERP could be expected to do the same afterwards. 
For another, let us suppose that, mirable dictu, the state actually priced correctly; i.e., 
charged more for rush hour than other traffic. We make the heroic assumption, here, 
that not only would they engage in some peak load pricing, but would actually be able 
to anticipate the market in this regard, all of this without benefit of any of capitalism’s 
weeding out process of profit and loss for business failures. Then, the problem would 
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arise that in so doing, we will have functioned as efficiency experts for the state; we 
would have, counterproductively, managed to improve state operation.  
Why is this “counterproductive”? Deontologically, because roadway management is 
simply not a legitimate role for the state, which should be, at least according to the 
philosophy of libertarianism, be confined to protection of persons and property 
through the provision of armies to keep foreign invaders from our shores, policies to 
quell local criminals, and courts to determine innocence or guilt. (21)  
But even on utilitarian grounds there are powerful arguments for not marginally 
improving state operation of roads. For if this is done, then the glorious day is put off 
even the more when government control ceases, and market forces once again take 
over this industry. For, make no mistake about it: public sector operation is 
responsible for an inordinate number of the tens of thousands of road fatalities which 
occur every year, and the sooner this can be stopped, the sooner this carnage will 
cease (or, at least be radically reduced.) (22)  
So, which is better, purely on utilitarian grounds: a quick marginal improvement in 
roadway operation (23) coupled with putting off the glorious day of fully private 
control for an indefinitely long period of time, or, not attempting to be efficiency 
experts for the state, allowing them to wallow in their misbegotten management, and 
achieving full privatization earlier. Unfortunately, there is no discount rate, social or 
otherwise, on the basis of which a definitive judgment of this question can be made. 
Thus, the implications of a purely utilitarian analysis are unclear. Hence, we resort to 
deontology. 
Then, too, there is the argument that if government charges tolls on the road, even if it 
engages in peak load pricing, inevitably more money will flow into its coffers. 
However, contrary to Galbraith, (24) at least from a libertarian perspective, the state 
already has far too much money at its disposal, and the people far too little. 
Therefore, this would constitute an argument against peak load pricing on the part of 
the public sector.(25) True, the government could disburse these new funds back to 
the long-suffering tax paying public, whether directly or in the form of tax reductions. 
But this is as unlikely as Dave Barry becoming the next president of the United States 
by acclamation.  
 
 
3.4. Public relations 
 
Right now, people are accustomed to street and highway use for “free.” How oh how 
will they ever be weaned away from this “entitlement” to which they have become 
accustomed? It will be appreciated that in a democracy, unless they are convinced to 
give up this privilege, there is little hope for ultimate privatization. 
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One approach is to reject this question as improper, even impertinent. After all, we 
are after the truth, here, with a capital “T” and if the masses are too moronic to see 
the benefits of privatization, well, they deserve to be killed like flies on the public 
highways, and to suffer the “slings and arrows of outrageous” traffic congestion. 
But let us take a more sober tack. There is, after all, specialization and a division of 
labor in all things, and our present concerns are no exception to this rule. The average 
motorist can be forgiven for not reflecting carefully on something which, in the very 
nature of things, is out of his purview. 
One tack in our public relations efforts might be to support such private road 
initiatives as California's State Route 91 and the “Dulles Greenway,” at either ends of 
our country. The advantage, here, is that there was no history of free access in either 
case; so it is not likely, or at least it is less so, that resentment will build up at having 
to pay for that which was hitherto enjoyed “for free.” If enough of these roadways are 
built, then, perhaps, eventually, the motoring public will come to see the benefits of 
this institution. 
A better approach might be to convey to the public that even if it could enjoy public 
provision of highways and streets “for free” and had to pay for private counterparts, it 
might still be worth it to do so, given that the latter option would be vastly preferable 
in terms of safety and congestion concerns. 
Better yet might be to point out to the typical motorist that he by no means enjoys 
public roadway services “for free.” Rather, that he pays for them, in the form of a 
myriad of taxes, both direct and indirect. Somehow, the term “freeways” indicates to 
him that he pays nothing for them. Although originally conceived as a characterization 
of the fact that highways were of limited access, without traffic lights, and thus that 
travelers could move “freely,” this phrase now functions to indicate to people that they 
pay nothing for them. Nothing could be further from the truth. And, given the general 
rule of thumb that private services come at a fraction of the cost of their public 
counterparts, it would be a shock to learn that this would not apply to the present 
situation. Thus, it is almost a given that the explicit costs of highway provision likely to 
be passed on to the consumer by a private industry would be a small part of those 
now imposed upon him, implicitly, in the form of hidden and not so hidden taxes. 
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